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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the district court's dismissal, without a
proper evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. (May
was denied the request for police reports, affidavits, evidence, witnesses, and
transcripts).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
May disputes the factual findings of the district court, and those stated
by the states counsel's. And states the follwing as presented in his initial brief and post-dconviction affidavit:
May was accosted and detained by highwaymen on a public road ( the
so-called victim and two other men) who admittedly stood in the middle of
the raod, knowing that May was approaching, and blocked him from moving
forward in his vehicle. One highwaymen admittedly had a weapon on his
person. Upon being 'heldup' on a public road by known assailants, whom had
professed animosity towards May, May did exit his vehicle after procuring
his own weapon and fired into an empty parked vehicle. Evidence requested
by May stipulates that the victim, Lambert, was not shot by May, but
injured from the ricochet of a piece of bull et that came off the parked
vehicle. At no time has May stipulated that he was using drugs at the time
of the incident it's self, nor has he claimed he was hallucinating or in
amental state at the time of the incident, only that his mental state
should have been taken into account for sentencing pruposes. All of which
is irrelevant due to the fact that may had a right to defend once stopped
by the highwaymen, regardless of how he had to endure to do it. Scared,
may left the scene. However, May's use of drugs prior to that day, or his
illogical actions after the incident, in no way diminish his right to
defend on a public road, and to want to present the evidence that
supported such claims at a trial, prior to sentencing.
May insisted from the onset of the criminal proceedings that his
attorney, Ben Anderson go to trial and prove May had a right to defend.
Anderson refused to present May's defense, or investigate the victims
actions and claims. When Anderson would not defend May, or prepare for
trail, May went before the court in December 2010 demanding that the court
Order Anderson to prepare for trial and present his defense, or disqualify
him and provide conflict counsel. The court refused to order Anderson, or
provide alternative counsel. the state has refused to provide the
appellant with these transcripts for evidentiary purposes. Upon having no
ability to go to trial or present a defense as requested and demanded, May
had no choice and was courced and forced by counsel and the courts
decision to plead guilty, even though he had already asserted actual
innocence with colorable evidence to support it through the victims own
statements of stopping May on the public road. plead guilty January 2011.
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It needs to be made clear that the evidence that the highwaymen
blocked the road, were armed with firearms, and had intent to stop and
hurt the Petitioner-Appellant is already on filed in the criminal appeal's
police reports, transcripts of the preliminary hearing, and that it was a
piece of a bullit not directed at the victim, is readily available for the
court to determine.
When May plead guilty, having no choice, he immediately attempted to
withdraw the plea within 48 hours through consel, Anderson. when Anderson
refused to entertain the motion, May sent a notice to the court of his
intent to withdraw and refusal to further retain Anderson under any
circumstances. It took three weeks to get Anderson off the case. The court
finally hired Tim Williams in March 2011. Williams immediately submitted a
Motion To Withdraw Plea based on May's claims and innocence. The court
improperly denied the motion without any consideration for May's innocence
claims or his right to receive a trial based on colorable evidence of
innocence due to self defense.
May was sentenced in May 2011, seven months after asserting his
innocence and Six months after requesting a trial and wanting to withdraw
his plea.
On appeal, May's appellate attorney, Spencer Haun refused to plead the
actual innocence claim as a viable defense and cause to withdraw his plea,
creating inefffective assistance of counsel, same as Anderson and
Williams. May has a right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel
against trial and appellate counsel, and their inadequate argument
concerning May's actual innocence claim removes the states argument that
the withdraw of plea claim is subject to res judicata and cannot be raised
in post-conviction, where it was raised based on counsels ineffectivness.
The state has refused to provide the Petitioner-Appellant with the
document's requested on appeal, as also did the trial court at evidentiary
proceedins. This is not due process. Hiding the truth is not the same as
proving the truth. May has a right to have the evidence that supports his
claims provided to him. It's not that much of a burden on the state to
provide the documents, other than the fact that it disproves their
contentions and proves that May had a colorable claim of innocence that
dictated that he be allowed to fire counsel first, and proceed to trial
second.
Considering the comp 1ete denial of access to the court May suffered
from through Anderson and the court refusing to disqualify him, any of
May's actions regardless of the states quickness to point them out (Plea
Advisory form), is irrelevant. may asserted innocence, wanted to go to
trial and get a lawyer who would do so, the court was fully aware of this,
and disregarded it completely, prejudicing May and his right to access to
a fair trial and present a defense. This level of denial of access to the
courts does in fact chi 11 the defendant's cons ti tuti ona l protections and
leaves him with little hope of being able to assert any right, and leaves
him courced to plead guilty, this is not a valid plea or conviction.
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ISSUES
May disputes the states practice of res ta ting the issues presented on
appeal in their reply brief. The issues are as the Appellant states them,
c'1:1ngi ng them alters the cons ti tuti ona l pri nci pl es that apply.

they are in

cr1ct:

1. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing a plea withdrawal prior
to sentencing; and whether the district court erred in determining that Mr.
May's plea was knowing; willing; and without duress?
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. may's
Post-Conviction Petition without applying an actual innocence standard of
review- and allowing evidentiary processes to make such an determination?

3

ARGUMENT
I.

Claims that have previously been raised to and decided by the court are not
barred under post-conviction proceedures act, if they are than raised under
post conviction act pursuant to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
A.

Introduction
Appellate counsel failed to raise the fact that May asserted actual

innocence and demanded a trial with out Ben Anderson, which was denied by the
court, forcing May to make a plea where he felt there was no choice because
counsel refused to go to trial and the cdourt agreed with counsel. This is an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim which is premitted in post-conviction
proceedings.

B.

Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court has rulled that errors committed by

counsel

at trial

and on appeal

may be raised in collateral

proceedings

(post-conviction) pyursuant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See:
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). Res Judicata does not apply.
C.

May's claim that counsel was ineffective in raising the issue on direct

appeal properly and without an actual innocence standard of review and argument
and without obtaining the evidence supporting it for appellate review is
cognizable in post-conviction and the states attempt to hide that fact is again
denial of access to the court and a violation of the post-conviction procedures
act and those precedents governing ineffective assistance of counsel on review.
Strickland, supra.

4

I I.

May has shown that the district court erred by dismissing his petition for
post-con vi ctfon rel i e-F 1,Ji th out pro vi ding proper evi den ti ary proceedings and
applying an actual innocence standard of review and timelyness of the request.
A.

Intoduction
At evi den ti ary in the post-conviction proceedings. the court refused to

provide May with the documents, transcripts, and police reports that supported
his claims, namely the transcript from the hearing where he asserted actual
innocence, requested that counsel be fired for refusing to go to trial, and
requested counsel that would present his defense of actual innocence. This
hearing and the transcripts that supported the claims was paramount to May's
claims.

and

the

police

reports

establishing

that

the

asdsaiulants

were

highwaymen, armed, and ballistics report that proved that May did not directly
fire at the victim were also necessary for evidentiary purposes and essential
to the claim, and therefore the hearing was nothing more than a summary
Judgment hearing, not an evidentiary hearing, which denied May due process.
Furthermore, the hearings and their trnascripts established the timeliness
of the request for

non-conflict counsel

and the timeliness of the

plea

withdrawal, well before sentencing. It also was clear that the prejudice to
May's actual innocence claim by not allowing a trial, once the claimwas made,
is without question readily obvious under constitutional standards.
B.

Standard of Review
The court ~ay not temper it's liberality when an actual innocence claim is

made, with colorable evidence, prior to trial, and a motion to withdraw plea is
asserted ·:timely (48 hours in this case) after entry and well before trial
and/or sentencing, and prejudice to the defendant has been established by the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (counsel's failure and refusal to
prepare and go to trial. Part of the voluntariness of a plea is the clear right
5

and knowing access to proceed to trial if requested and wanted. May's chilled
constitutional protections clearly contributed to his plea of guilty, where he
believed and was tempered by the court to accept counsels refusal to proceed to
trial and refusal to prepare an actual innocence defense. May was clearly under
the direct counsel

of the court

to

keep

counsel

and

counsel's

demenor

(ineffectivness and refusal to go to or prepare for trial).
May essentially challenged the indictment and asserted that it failed to
state a charge in December, 2010. He admitted his actions as a defense, and
thus his actions were not a crime. A charging document will be deemed so flawed
that is fails to confer jurisdiction on the court if the facts alleged are not
made criminal by statute or if the document fails to state facts essential to
establish the offense charged. State v. Byington, 135 Idaho 621, 623, 21 P.3d
943, 945 (Ct.App.2001); Hays v. State, 113 Idaho736, 739, 747 P.2d 758, 761
(Ct.App.1987);

aff'd,

115

Idaho 315,

316,

766

P.2d

785,

786

(1988).

A

Jurisdictional defect is not vJaived by a guilty plea, Byington, 135 Idaho at
623, 21 P.3d at 945, the timing of May's challenge to the information, coming
before the plea was entered in December, 2010, and the request for a trial than
and in December 2010, and the plea being entered in January 2011, and two days
later requesting to withdraw the plea and firing Anderson of his own accord,
affects the level of scrutiny that applys in evaluating the sufficiency of tie
information. If an alleged deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or
entry of a guilty plea, the charging document must state all facts essential to
establish the charged offense, State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165,168, 75 P.3d
219, 222 (Ct.App.2003); Byington, 135 Idaho at 623, 21 P.3d at 945. And the
affirmative defense implied by the defendant

applied

to

those

facts

in

correlation with the facts that support his claim of innocence, prior to trial.
6

III.

May made a timely request to withdraw his plea, and had "just reason" to do so,
that being his actual innocence claim and ineffective assistance of counsel.
A.

Introduction
Neither the implied sentence, presentence report (which had not been filed

yet), nor any other outside factor except that already on record, that of
actual innocence and counsel's failure to prepare and present a defense and go
to trial dictated the request to withdrawal the plea and go to trial. No
impermissible motives were presented by May or asserted by May nor were any
impermissible factors relevant after actual innocence and ineffectivness was
asserted.
B.

Standard of Review
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), the withdrawal of a guilty plea may be

allowed in the trial court's discretion. The scope of that discretion is
affected by the timing of the request or motion. Where the motion is filed
before sentencing, the defendant need only show a "just reason'' for withdrawing
the plea.

!.C.R. 33(c);

1151, 1153

(1988);

State

State v.
v.

Dopp,

(Ct.App.1992);

State

v.

Johnson,

(Ct.App.1991);

State

v.

Hocker,

Ballard,
124
120
115

114 Idaho 799,

Idaho

512,516,

801,

861

761 P.2d

P.2d

82,86

Idaho

408,411,

816

P.2d

364,367

Idaho

137,139,

765

P.2d

162,164

(Ct.App.1988).
In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, and voluntariness
requires that the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he is
pleading guilty. Part of that understanding is a clear evaluation of an
affirmative defense if asserted, and the desire to present such a defense at
trial, and the knowing ability to do so if requested and wanted. Telling a
defendsant he has no defense, cannot present one, and may not proceed to trial,
and than excepting his plea of guilty because he has no choice is not knowing
7

willing and voluntary. Believing he has no choice cannot be construed as knowing
in any sense of the concept of a willing plea. Boykin v. alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
The affirmative defense and actual innocence claim and request for a trial
to present that defense was not explained to May in respect to why, if any
reason existed, he could not do so, only that the denial was effectuated
through refusal to fire counsel. the intent element was not explained to May,
as it applies to an affirmative defense. Meaning, intent is irelevant or not a
crime if he had a right to defend. may entered the plea without having adequate
notice of the offense to which he was pleading guilty to. Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).

Intent is such a critical

element of an offense, that notice of that element is required, especially as
it relates to an actual innocence claim of self defense. Morgan, 426 U.S. at
647 n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 2253 n. 18.
Idaho Court's held that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied a subsequent motion to withdraw a guilty pl ea on the ground that the
defendant had not been informed of the intent element of the crime. See:
State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho at 414, 744 P.2d at 798.
May points out that he was informed by counsel and the court that intent
was irrelevant, a defense was irrelevant, and he had no choise but to proceed
without one, and plead guilty.
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IV.
May presented his claims in his post-conviction pursuant to an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, both trial counsel and appellate counsel. His
evidencre, being both the transcripts and police reports and ballistics
reports, was not allowed to be presented, at any time.
A.

Introduction
At no time has May's claims been evaluated based on ineffective assistance

of counsel. neither his attempt to fire counsel prior to pleading, nor his
assertion that appellate counsel failed to represent his actual

innocence

claims. The evidence that he was the one who was stopped by highwaymen, armed,
and out to get him, was presented by the victims own testimony at the
preliminary hearing. counsel's refusal to develope this evidence and present it
in at a trial to prove May's innocence is obvious ineffectivness, not to
men ti on prosecutori al misconduct and judicial misconduct for suppressing it
when May attempted to withdraw his plea and go to trial.
B.

Standard of Review
A defendant seeking relief for ineffective assistance of counsel must show

both that the attorney's representation was deficient and that the defendant
was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This requires a showing that the defense attorney
made errors so serious that the attorney was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed

to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.

Id.

To satisfy

the

prejudice prong, the defendant must demonstrate that, but for counsel's errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct.
2052; Aragomn v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761, 760 P.2d 1174,1177 (1988). When it
is asserted that a guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance, to
prove the prejudice prong the defendant "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59,
9

106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). See also Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho
76,82, 57 P.3d 787,793 (2002); Menchaca v. State, 128 Idaho 649,652, 917 P.2d
806,809 (Ct.App.1996).

May has made every attempt to get the state to produce the transcripts and
police reports to him sdo he can present them to this court. the state wants to
deny them, and than complain that May has not proven his claims, which are
in fact proven from the hearing where he tried to fire Anderson as counsel, and
the report's

showing that the assailiants

(highwaymen)

had

intentionally

stopped him, were armed, and intent on hurting him. for the state to deny the
documents, than complain the facts hasve not been presented when they hold the
facts prejudicially, is not due process, and is misconduct at best.
The

courts

post-conbviction

are

required

relief,

if

it

to

order

discovery

is

necessary

to

on

protect

application

for

the applicant's

substantive riughts. The appellate courts are also held to that same standard.
I.C.

§

19-4906; Criminal Rule 57(b).
CONCLUSION

Miy respectfully requests that this court grant May's request to withdraw
his plea of guilty, vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence, and allow
him to proceed to trial on an actual innocence claim based on an affirmative
defense of his right to defend against being stopped by highwaymen on a public
road, armed, and intent on doing him harm.
Or an and other relief so deemed just and necessary by this honorable
court.
DATED This__day of February, 2015
MARKCUS RAYMOND'11AY
Petitioner-Appellant Prose
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